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Imagine the following: 
 
Five public school teachers, also baseball fans, get together and decide to attend 
opening day at Comerica Park.  Unfortunately, only two of the five have any days 
they are able to legitimately take off in order to attend the ball game.  The three 
teachers that are unable to take any days off are advised by the other two teachers 
to call in sick.  On opening day, the two teachers with days off available take their 
respective days, and the other three teachers collectively call in sick.  The next 
day, the principal of the school calls all five into his office and states that all five 
will be docked a full days pay for their one-day strike and are immediately 
terminated. 
 
Under the Michigan Public Employee Relations Act [hereinafter PERA], what result if 
the termination and fine is challenged?  What if instead of attending a baseball game, the five 
teachers engaged in a work stoppage in order to protest the termination of their recently elected 
collective bargaining representative, an alleged unfair labor practice?  How about if they stopped 
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working because of their public employer’s refusal to bargain in good faith?  Or, what if they 
wanted to pressure the local School Board to concede to their contract demands for more pay?  
Does it matter if they weren’t public school teachers at all; but instead were public transit 
employees?  Should these factors have an impact on the result?  Does the result depend upon 
what year (and what version of PERA) the incident occurred?  Should it? 
This paper attempts to answer these questions by taking a historical look at how 
Michigan public employment law has evolved over the past half-century.  In addition, this paper 
critically examines how the Michigan Legislature has treated labor-management relations in the 
public sector during this time period.  In order to accomplish this, this paper focuses on 
Michigan’s treatment of unfair labor practice strikes by public employees, and evaluates the 
Legislature’s chosen policies by contrasting public employment law in Michigan with the 
machinery established under the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA]. 
Part I begins by describing the NLRA, its purpose, the theories behind it, and the 
importance of a balance of power between capital and labor to successful collective bargaining.  
Part II describes the evolution of Michigan public employment law and collective bargaining 
under it; from the punitive Hutchinson Act of 1947, to the promise of PERA in 1965, and finally 
to the PERA Amendments of 1994.  Part III looks at the policies behind public employment law 
and evaluates the Legislature’s prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes by public school 
employees and the potential effect such a prohibition could have on collective bargaining in the 
public sector.  This paper concludes with the position that the framework established by the 
NLRA is fully capable of addressing the concerns of the Michigan Legislature in prohibiting 
public employee strikes and that the Legislature’s prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes was 
unnecessarily punitive. 
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I.  THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
A.  The Purpose and Theory Behind the Act  
 In the private sector, labor-management relations are governed by the National Labor 
Relations Act [hereinafter the NLRA].1  The NLRA has been controlling since Congress 
established the ground rules for labor relations in the United States by passing the Wagner Act in 
1935.2  The heart and soul of the Wagner Act are the rights protected by Section 7.  Under 
section 7, private employees have the right to (1) organize, (2) bargain collectively, and (3) to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of (a) collective bargaining or (b) “other 
mutual aid or protection.”3  Although the NLRA does not specifically address strikes, “other 
concerted activities” has consistently been held to include strike activity in the private sector.4 
 Section 7 rights were to be enforced and implemented through other sections of the Act5 
which outlawed employer “interfere[nce] with, restrain[ment], or coerc[ion]” of employees 
exercising Section 7 rights,6 forbade “company-unions,”7 prohibited “discrimination . . . 
[intended] to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,”8 and imposed 
upon the employer the duty to bargain collectively in good faith with its employees’ selected 
representative.9 
                                                          
1 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). 
2 See Wagner Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449. 
3 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
4 See Donna Williamson, Teachers and Other Public Sector Employees: How Can We More Effectively Respond to 
the Concerted Activity Questions?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 813 (1989).  “Utilization of this phrase in other 
collective bargaining statutes, in both private and public sectors, has been held to represent an express grant of the 
right to strike.”  Williamson, supra. 
5 See ARCHIBALD COX, ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 82 (13th  ed. 2001). 
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(1). 
7 See id. § 8(a)(2). 
8 See id. § 8(a)(3). 
9 See id. §§ 8(a)(5) & 9(a). 
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The purpose of the Act was both to provide workers with the ability and strength to 
increase their wages and standard of living and to reduce the number of labor disputes.10  The 
NLRA has been successful in achieving these dual goals for a number of reasons.  By prohibiting 
employer unfair labor practices and requiring employers to recognize and bargain with their 
employees’ appropriately selected representative, the NLRA serves to reduce strikes intended 
either to protest employer unfair labor practices or to force an employer to recognize and bargain 
with a representative.11 
Generally, however, collective bargaining really works for two reasons: (1) in and of 
itself, collective bargaining brings parties together; and (2) the threat of the strike and its 
resultant damage to both sides encourages parties to compromise.12  There are arguably four 
reasons collective bargaining itself brings about a resolution to potential disputes.13  First, the 
collective bargaining process brings employers and employees together, forcing both sides to 
exchange viewpoints and narrow areas of disagreement.14  Second, recognition, experience, and 
maturity can bring responsibility to labor unions which encourages settlement and minimizes 
irresponsible union behavior.15  Third, collective bargaining replaces the weaker bargaining 
position of the individual employee with the organized employee collective, strengthening 
bargaining position and allowing unions to secure greater wages and labor standards.16  Finally, 
                                                          
10 See COX, supra note 5, at 83. 
11 See id. at 83.  “Everyone who had been in a tough wage negotiation where the stakes were high knows that the 
bargain is never struck until one minute before midnight when there is no place to go, nothing left to do, no possible 
escape from choosing between a strike a compromise.”  Id. 
12 “[T]he strike or the fear of a strike is the motive power that makes collective bargaining operate.”  Id. at 489. 
13 See id. at 83. 
14 See id.  
15 See id. 
16 See COX, supra note 5, at 83. 
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by rule of law, collective bargaining removes the unilateral implementation of employer 
objectives and replaces it with bilateral discussion.17 
 But even though the collective bargaining process itself tends to minimize labor disputes, 
the underlying motivation of the employer to bargain arises out of the employer’s desire to avoid 
a costly work stoppage.  As stated by one group of commentators: 
[i]n the final analysis collective bargaining works as a method of fixing terms and 
conditions of employment only because there comes a time when both sides 
conclude that the risks of losses through a strike are so great that compromise is 
cheaper than economic battle.18 
 
 The strike as an economic weapon serves to balance bargaining power between 
labor and management and thereby promote collective bargaining between relative 
equals. 
B.  The Balance of Power and the Unfair Labor Practice Strike 
 Collective bargaining under the NLRA works because there has been a legislative and 
judicial focus on equalizing the relative bargaining power of management and labor.  As stated 
by Justice Brennan in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.19--“in enacting § 7 of the NLRA, 
Congress sought generally to [legislatively] equalize the bargaining power of the employee with 
that of his employer.”20  As an example of the judicial focus, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the use of the strike by a union to exert economic pressure on an employer 
during negotiations is consistent with the labor organizations reciprocal duty to bargain in good 
faith.21  As a result, an employer’s duty to bargain does not terminate when private employees go 
                                                          
17 See id. 
18 COX, supra note 5 at 488 (emphasis added). 
19 465 U.S. 822 (1984). 
20 NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984). 
21 See e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
The reason why the ordinary economic strike is not evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith is 
not that it constitutes a protected activity but that, as we have developed, there is simply no 
inconsistency between the application of economic pressure and good-faith collective bargaining. 
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on strike.22  This maintains pressure on the employer during an economic strike and maintains a 
balance between the interests of management and labor. 
This balance can also be demonstrated by the judiciary’s approach to unfair labor practice 
strikes.  According to Supreme Court precedent, when an employee goes on strike in order to 
exert economic pressure on their employer, that striking employee retains their status as an 
employee during the strike.23  As a result, “an economic striker who [subsequently makes 
themselves] . . . available . . . [for work] is entitled to full reinstatement unless there [are] 
legitimate and substantial business justifications for the failure to offer complete 
reinstatement.”24  The employer, however, may meet this burden by demonstrating that it hired 
permanent replacements for the striking workers in order to keep its business open.25  In such a 
situation, the economic striker will not be entitled to his old job.  This approach maintains a 
balance by considering both the legitimate interests of the employer in protecting its business and 
the interest of the employee in exerting economic pressure. 
The NLRB and the judiciary have taken a different approach to employee work stoppages 
in response to employer unfair labor practices.26  Where employees go on strike to protest an 
employer’s unfair labor practice, and a striking employee applies for reinstatement, the employee 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Id. 
22 This is true as long as the use of economic pressure does not involve demands that fall outside the scope of  
“wages, hours and other terms or conditions of employment.”  Striking over “permissive” rather than “mandatory” 
subjects of bargaining will constitute a failure to bargain in good faith.  See COX, supra note 5, at 536. 
23 See Laidlaw Corp. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1966) (“by virtue of Section 2(3) of the Act, an individual whose work 
ceases due to a labor dispute remains an employee if he has not obtained other regular or substantially equivalent 
employment . . . and . . . an employer refusing to reinstate strikers must show that the action was due to legitimate 
and substantial business justifications”). 
24 Laidlaw, 171 N.L.R.B. at 1366. 
25 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
[A]n employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has [not] lost the right to protect and 
continue is business by supplying spaces left vacant by strikers.  And he is not bound to discharge 
those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, 
in order to create places for them. 
Id. 
26 See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
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is unconditionally entitled to his old job, regardless of the permanency of his replacement or any 
legitimate business justifications for refusing reinstatement.27  In this situation, the additional 
societal interest in preventing employer unfair labor practices justifies a shift in leverage to the 
employees in order to prevent the employer from benefiting from its own unlawful conduct.28 
An unfair labor practice strike differs from an economic strike in other ways also.  Where 
strikers engage in unprotected activity,29 the NLRB has the power to reinstate terminated unfair 
labor practice strikers but does not have the power to reinstate terminated economic strikers.30  
Reinstatement of an unfair labor practice striker, however, will probably not be allowed where 
the striker has engaged in violence or a breach of the peace.31 
Additionally, under the NLRA, statutory and contractual obligations not to engage in 
“strike” activity do not always prohibit unfair labor practice strikes.32  A work stoppage in 
response to an employer’s unfair labor practice will not be considered a “strike” within the 
contractual or statutory definition.  In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,33 for example, the 
Supreme Court held that where employees went on strike in protest of an employer’s unfair labor 
practice,34 the strike did not violate the “no-strike” clause in the collective bargaining 
                                                          
27 See In Matter of Shoe Brown CO., 1 N.L.R.B. 803 (1936) (“[a]n order requiring the [employer] to cease and 
desist from such conduct will not wholly restore the union to at least the position it occupied . . . on the day of  {the 
unfair labor practice] strike.  We, shall, therefore, in order to restore the status quo, order the [employer] to offer 
reinstatement to those employees . . . who went out on strike [in response to the employer’s unfair labor practice] . . . 
and . . . to displace [replacement] employees”). 
28 “First, the employer’s antecedent unfair labor practices may have been so blatant that they provoked employees to 
resort to unprotected action.  Second, reinstatement is the only sanction which prevents an employer from benefiting 
from his unfair labor practices through discharges which may weaken or destroy a union.”  Local 833, UAW v. 
NLRB (Kohler Co.), 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962).  
29 Activity outside the protection of Section 7.  See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
30 See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954) (“[where the employees engage in unprotected activity,] 
the National Labor Relations Board has power under § 10(c) to order reinstatement if the discharges were not “for 
cause” and if such an order would effectuate the policies of the Act”).   See also COX, supra note 5, at 585.  
31 See e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984). 
32 See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). 
33 350 U.S. 270 (1956). 
34 The employer had terminated an employee for engaging in union activity during a “cooling off” period under 
Section 8(d).  See Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S.at 270. 
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agreement.35   According to the Court, a no-strike clause only prohibits economic strikes—not 
unfair labor practice strikes.36  In addition, despite the strike occurring within a mandatory 60-
day “cooling off” period under Section 8(d) of the NLRA, the strike was not prohibited because 
the object of the strike was not “termination or modification” of the contract and therefore 
compliance with the 60-day “cooling off” period was unnecessary.37 
Under the NLRA, determining the cause of a work stoppage (or the object of a strike) is 
necessary to determine the strike’s consequences.  Where the strike is purely to exert economic 
pressure on the employer, or solely in response to an employer’s unfair labor practice, 
determining the cause is not difficult.  The issue becomes more complicated, however, when 
what began as an economic strike has been prolonged because of an employer’s unfair labor 
practice.38  In this situation, the unfair labor practice will “convert” the economic strike into an 
unfair labor practice strike.39  Striking employees that are permanently replaced prior to the 
employer’s unfair labor practice are not entitled to reinstatement while striking employees 
permanently replaced during the unfair labor practice “phase” of the strike are entitled to 
reinstatement.40 
 The distinction between unfair labor strikes and economic strikes serves two purposes.  
First, in the immediate sense, it discourages unfair labor practices by the employer.  Second, and 
ultimately, the distinction serves to protect the balance of power between management and labor 
necessary for effective collective bargaining.  In public employment law, however, the 
distinction becomes less clear and the balance of power more difficult to maintain because of 
many states’ prohibition of public employee strikes.  Michigan is one such state that prohibits 
                                                          
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See e.g., Laidlaw, 171 N.L.R.B. at 1366. 
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public employee strikes.  In Michigan, however, the legislature has added an unnecessary level 
of complexity by prohibiting public school employee unfair labor strikes and thereby 
detrimentally affecting the balance of power between labor and management and ultimately the 
success of public employment collective bargaining. 
II.  MICHIGAN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW AND THE PROHIBITED STRIKE 
A.  1947-1965 
1.  The Hutchinson Act 
 In 1947, the Michigan Legislature passed the Hutchinson Act,41 and established simple 
yet strict rules under which public employers and their employees were to deal with each other. 
Although the Hutchinson Act required mediation of grievances submitted by a majority 
of a group of employees by the Labor Mediation Board,42 the Act prohibited strikes by public 
employees43 and imposed mandatory penalties on striking public employees44 and their 
supporters.45  The Act defined “strike activity” in two ways.  First, the Act defined a ‘strike’ as: 
the failure to report for duty, the willful absence from one’s position, the stoppage 
of work, or the abstinence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper 
performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, 
influencing or coercing a change in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, 
privileges or obligations of employment.46 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Under this definition, even a single public employee could go on strike, if that employee 
stopped working in order to exert some concession from their employer related to the 
 
39 See id. 
40 See COX, supra note 5, at  583-86. 
41 See Act of July 3, 1947, 1947 Public Act 336 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 423.201-08 (Ann Arbor Press 
1948) [hereinafter Hutchinson Act]. 
42 See Hutchinson Act § 7. 
43 See Hutchinson Act § 2. 
44 See Hutchinson Act § 4. 
45 See Hutchinson Act § 8. 
46 Hutchinson Act § 1. 
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“conditions, . . . compensation, . . . rights, privileges or obligations of employment.”47  Second, 
the Act stated that “any [public employee] . . . who, by concerted action with others . . . wilfuly 
absent[ed] himself from his position or abstain[ed] in whole or in part from the full, faithful and 
proper performance of his duties, shall be deemed to be on strike.”48  Under this section, a 
concerted willful refusal to work, regardless of its purpose, although not a “strike” as defined by 
the statute, would be treated as if it were a strike. 
 Under the Hutchinson Act, the penalties for engaging in “strike activity” were mandatory, 
strict, and swift.  Any public employee considered on strike “thereby abandon[ed] and 
terminate[d] his . . . employment [and was] no longer entitled to any of the rights or emoluments 
thereof, including pension or retirement rights or benefits.”49  A public employee contesting such 
termination of employment was only entitled to a post-termination proceeding to determine 
whether or not the public employee was actually on strike or rightfully deemed to be on strike.50  
In addition, any person not a public employee who “knowingly incite[d], agitate[d], influence[d], 
coerce[d], or urge[d] a public employee to strike [was] . . . guilty of a misdemeanor . . . 
punish[able] by imprisonment for [up to] . . . 1 year, . . . a fine of [up to] . . . $1,000.00, or 
both.”51  The potential reach of this provision was immense, bringing within its scope unions, 
union representatives, and even the entire public. 
2.  Case Law in Response to the Hutchinson Act 
 Four years after the enactment of the Hutchinson Act, the Michigan Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutionality of the Act’s prohibition of public employee strikes in City of 
Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach 
                                                          
47 Hutchinson Act § 1. 
48 Hutchinson Act § 7. 
49 Hutchinson Act § 4. 
50 Hutchinson Act § 6. 
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Employers of America.52  In City of Detroit, the city filed a bill to enjoin an ongoing strike by 
public transit employees and for a declaration of the validity of the Hutchinson Act.53  In 
response, the striking public employees filed a crossbill to prevent enforcement of the Act.54 
 The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Hutchinson Act and described 
the public policy reasons for a prohibition on public employee strikes.  First, the Court reiterated 
that a public employee has no constitutional right to public employment, nor does public 
employment vest in public employees any “fixed or permanent rights of employment.”55  
Second, according to the Court “[t]here seem[ed] to be ample reason and authority for holding 
that the right of public employees to collectively refuse to render the service for which they 
[we]re employed differ[ed] in legal point of view from the right of private employees to strike.”56  
The distinction between public and private employment was justified because of (1) the 
importance of rendering essential government services;57 (2) the absence of a right to strike 
under the common law;58 and (3) the sovereignty principle.59  For these reasons, a prohibition on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
51 Hutchinson Act § 8. 
52 332 Mich. 237; 51 N.W.2d 228 (1951). 
53 See City of Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgated Ass’n of Street, Electrical Railway & Motor Coach 
Employees of America, 332 Mich. 237, 242; 51 N.W.2d 228 (1951). 
54 See City of Detroit, 332 Mich. at 242. 
55 Id. at 247. 
56 Id. at 248. 
57 See id. at 247-48. 
To hold otherwise would result in public agencies being powerless to render public service and to 
effectively administer public affairs; and the public would thereby be deprived of its right to 
efficient government.  For example, if the members of a fire department or of a police department 
collectively refuse to continue to serve except upon conditions insisted upon by them, . . . the 
public . . . would be deprived of fire or of police protection; and the right or power to exercise 
essential government affairs nullified. 
Id. at 248.  Fire fighters and police officers have since been allowed compulsory arbitration in an attempt to boost 
employee morale and efficiency and to replace the absence of a right to strike.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
423.231-47 (West 2001).  In addition, to a certain extent privatization and the essential services provided by private 
employees undermine this rationale today. 
58 See City of Detroit, 332 Mich. at 248.  “Under the common law, . . . there is no right to strike on behalf of public 
employees . . . [since] it is a means of coercing the delegation of the discretion which a public board or public body 
must exercise in its fulfillment of its duties”  Id. at 248-49  (quoting City of Cleveland v. Division 268, 41 Ohio Op. 
236; 90 NE2d 711 (19__).  This reasoning today is at best questionable since public employees’ collective 
bargaining rights by their very nature interfere with the discretion of a public body or board.  The legitimacy of the 
reasoning of City of Detroit was brought into serious question recently by  the Claifornia Supreme Court in 
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public employee strikes was constitutional as was the immediate termination of employment of 
public employees that did go on strike. 
 Although its underpinnings have since been seriously questioned, City of Detroit 
established the validity of the Hutchinson Act’s prohibition of public employee strikes.  City of 
Detroit, the Hutchinson Act’s broad definition of conduct deemed “strike activity” and the stiff 
penalties for participating or encouraging a strike were strong deterrents to public employee 
work stoppages of any kind, regardless of the statutory definition of “strike.”  In the early 1960s, 
however, the Michigan Legislature reconsidered the punitive nature of the Hutchinson Act; and, 
in 1965, the Legislature amended the Act—radically altering the balance of power between labor 
and management. 
B.  1966-1994 
1.  The Public Employees Relations Act of 1965 
 In 1965, the Hutchinson Act was amended to protect, as much as possible, the same 
rights protected in the private employment sector under the NLRA.60  This fundamental shift 
provided public employees a meaningful voice in setting the terms and conditions of their 
employment.  Although the Act still contained a prohibition on strikes by public employees, the 
Act now provided public employees with collective bargaining rights using the same language as 
the NLRA.61 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
CaliforniaCounty Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass’n, 38 Cal.3d 564; 699 P.2d 835 
(1985) (finding that California’s longstanding prohibition on public-employee strikes under the California common 
law arbitrary and suggesting that all workers, both public and private, have the constitutional right to withhold labor 
incident to the right of association of federal and state constitutions such that the exercise of the right to strike could 
not be infringed upon absent a compelling justification).  See also infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
59 “[Public employees] are agents of the government.  They exercise some part of the sovereignty entrusted to it.  
They occupy a status entirely different from those who carry on a private enterprise. . . . To say that they can strike 
is the equivalent of saying that they can deny the authority of government.”  Id. at 248. 
60 See Act of July 23, 1965, 1965 Public Act 379 [hereinafter PERA]. 
61 See PERA §§ 9-16. 
Section 7 of the NLRA provides: 
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Under what was now considered the Public Employees Relations Act [hereinafter 
PERA], public employees were granted considerable collective bargaining rights protected in an 
elaborate enforcement scheme.  PERA gave public employees the right to form or join labor 
organizations and to engage in “lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to negotiate . . . through representatives of their 
own choosing.”62  PERA prohibited public employers from interfering, restraining, or coercing 
public employees in the exercise of these rights, initiating, creating, dominating, contributing to 
or interfering with any labor organization, or discriminating against labor organizations or public 
employees.63 
In addition, PERA provided a mechanism for the designation and election of an exclusive 
bargaining representative,64 imposed a duty of good faith bargaining on the employer,65 created a 
fact-finding procedure, analogous to the NLRA procedure, to resolve alleged violations of public 
employees’ section 10 rights,66 and required mediation, upon the request of either the public 
employee representative or the public employer, to facilitate collective bargaining.67 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 157. 
Section 9 of PERA provides: 
[i]t shall be lawful for public employees to organize together or to form, join or assist in labor 
organizations, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their 
public employers through representatives of their own free choice. 
PERA § 9. 
62 PERA § 9. 
63 See PERA § 10. 
64 See PERA §§ 11, 12 & 14. 
65 See PERA § 15. 
66 See PERA § 16.  Section 10 stated: 
Sec. 10.  It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an officer or agent of a public employer (a) 
to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in 
section 9; (b) to initiate, create, dominate, contribute to or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization: Provided, That a public employer shall not be prohibited 
from permitting employees to confer with it during hours without loss of time or pay; (c) to 
discriminate in regard to hire, terms or other conditions of employment in order to encourage or 
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The creation of collective bargaining rights in the public employment context was not the 
only departure from the Hutchinson Act.  PERA also made significant changes with respect to its 
approach to public employee strikes.  The 1965 amendments repealed the provisions relating to 
the automatic termination of striking public employees68 and the imprisonment and fine penalties 
imposed upon non-public employees for their support of public employee strikes.69 
PERA also modified its definition of “strike activity.”  The Hutchinson Act had contained 
two definitions of “strike activity.”  The first had defined a strike by its motivation: a work 
stoppage by one or more public employees “for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing 
a change in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of 
employment.”70  The second had deemed conduct a strike regardless of its motivation if it was 
part of a “concerted action with others . . . to willfully absent[] [one]self from his position or [to] 
abstain[] in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of [one’s] duties.”71  
PERA retained the first definition of “strike” and still required a determination that the willful 
absence from work was “for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the 
conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment”72 in order 
for a work stoppage to be defined as a strike.  PERA modified, however, the conduct that would 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discourage membership in a labor organization; (d) to discriminate against a public employee 
because he has given testimony or instituted proceedings under this act; or (e) to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of its public employees, subject to the provisions of section 
11. 
PERA § 10.  Section 9 provided: 
Sec. 9.  It shall be lawful for public employees to organize together to form, join or assist in labor 
organizations, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or 
bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to negotiate collectively with their public 
employers through representatives of their own free choice. 
PERA § 9. 
67 See PERA § 7.  Mediation is an aid to collective bargaining encouraged by law.  See Lake Michigan College 
Federation of Teachers v. Lake Michigan College, 60 Mich. App. 747; 231 N.W.2d 538 (1975). 
68 See Hutchinson Act § 5. 
69 See Hutchinson Act § 8. 
70 Hutchinson Act § 1. 
71 Hutchinson Act § 6. 
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be deemed “strike activity.”  Under PERA, the non-performance of one’s duties in “concerted 
action with others . . . for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the 
conditions or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment [was to] be 
deemed . . . strike [activity].”73  In other words, under PERA, conduct defined a strike was the 
exact same conduct deemed a strike.  Therefore, in order to be punishable under PERA, a work 
stoppage of any kind had to be for the purpose of influencing a change in the conditions of 
employment.  The following diagram may help illustrate this distinction: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
72 PERA § 1. 
73 PERA § 6 (emphasis added). 
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  The difference in conduct deemed to be strike activity between the 1947 Hutchinson Act 
and the 1965 PERA amendments, coupled with the removal of the stiff penalties of the 
Hutchinson Act and the creation of collective bargaining rights in the public employment sector 
combined to create an atmosphere where economic weapons, previously little utilized in the 
public employment setting, were wielded with full force, especially in the public education 
sector.  In addition, the similarities between PERA and the NLRA allowed the Michigan 
judiciary and the MERC to draw upon established U.S. Supreme Court precedent and policy 
interpretation of private sector labor law. 
2.  Case Law in Response to the PERA Amendments 
 Fairly quickly, Michigan Courts were presented with opportunities to interpret the 
changes to the Hutchinson Act and PERA’s new approach to striking public employees.74  In 
every major case, however, the striking employees were public school teachers, and, 
accordingly, the law that developed was a reaction to the public school teacher strike. 
 The Michigan Supreme Court first addressed the PERA amendments in 1967 in School 
District for the City of Holland v. Holland Education Ass’n.75  In City of Holland, the Supreme 
Court held that the requirements for a labor injunction in the public employee context were the 
same as they were in the private sector.76  In 1967, the teachers in the School District for the City 
of Holland refused to resume their teaching duties for the beginning of the school year.77  The 
teachers did not contest that their conduct constituted a strike for the purposes of PERA.78  The 
School District had easily obtained a temporary injunction simply by demonstrating to the 
                                                          
74 School District for the City of Holland v. Holland Education Ass’n, 380 Mich. 314; 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). 
75 380 Mich. 314; 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). 
76 See City of Holland, 380 Mich. at 325. 
77 See id. at 320. 
 17
Chancellor that “if the injunction did not issue, the district’s schools would not open.”79  
However, according to the Supreme Court: 
The legislature intended that injunctive relief could be granted [under PERA], but 
that courts are not required to grant it in every case involving a strike by public 
employees.  To attempt to compel, legislatively, a court of equity in every instance 
of a public employee strike to enjoin it would be to destroy the independence of 
the judicial branch of government.80. . . [I]t is . . . contrary to public policy in this 
State to issue injunctions in labor disputes absent a showing of violence, 
irreparable injury, or breach of the peace.81 
 
 After City of Holland, for a public employer to enjoin a public employee strike, the 
public employer had to make a showing of “violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the peace” 
in order to gain relief.  City of Holland is an important decision, not only because it established 
the independence of the judiciary, but also because it provided public employees with the ability 
to strike—so long as the public employer was unable to make the required showing.82  
 The Michigan Supreme Court exerted further influence on the public employment 
collective bargaining process in Rockwell v. Crestwood School District Board of Education.83  In 
Rockwell, after a lengthy labor dispute with the Crestwood School District Board of Education 
and unfair labor practice charges filed by the Crestwood Education Association against the 
School Board, the teachers of Crestwood Schools refused to commence the 1974 school year.84  
In October 1974, injunctive orders were issued and classes reconvened, but in December 1974, 
the teachers once again stopped working.85  The School Board thereupon required teachers to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 326. 
80 Id. at 325. 
81 Id. at 326 (emphasis added). 
82 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court was denied the opportunity to rule on the 
constitutionality of the legislature’s determination that public school employee strikes should be enjoined without 
balancing of the equities in 1996.  See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
83 393 Mich. 616; 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975). 
84 See Rockwell v. Crestwood School District Board of Education, 393 Mich. 616, 626; 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975). 
85 See Rockwell, 393 Mich. at 626. 
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either report to work, submit a letter of resignation, or be terminated.86  Thirty-eight teachers 
reported for work, one resigned, and 184 teachers were terminated.87 
 In its opinion, the Court began its analysis by pointing out that PERA was “the dominant 
law regulating public employee labor relations.”88  The Court then noted that the teachers 
claimed they justifiably refused to work “because they had not been able to negotiate a new labor 
contract since August, 1973.”89  Undeniably then, the work stoppage was for the purpose of 
“coercing a change in the conditions . . . of employment.”90  This “purpose” brought the teachers 
conduct within the scope of prohibited strike activity under PERA.  At the same time, however, 
the problems in negotiation arguably arose because of the public school employer’s alleged 
refusal to bargain in good faith.91  The strike, therefore, was also potentially in response to the 
public school employer’s unfair labor practices.  Accordingly, the Court undertook an in-depth 
analysis of the potential impact of an unfair labor practice strike on a public employer’s right to 
terminate a “striking” employee under PERA. 
 The Court proceeded by recognizing that Michigan labor relations acts were modeled 
after the NLRA.92  The Court then noted: 
[f]ederal cases recognize an employer’s right to hire replacements for strikers.  
“Economic strikers” have limited rights of reinstatement.  “Unfair labor practice” 
strikers have an absolute right to reinstatement—unless guilty of misconduct—
even if the employer has hired permanent replacements.93 
 
The Court also stated that “[a]lthough a strike begins as an economic strike, if it is 
determined that the employer engaged in an unfair labor practice, the strike may be held to be an 
                                                          
86 See id.  
87 See id. 
88 Id. at 629. 
89 Id. at 632. 
90 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202 (1970). 
91 See Rockwell, 393 Mich. at 627. 
92 See Rockwell, 393 Mich. at 635-36; 29 U.S.C. 151-69 (1994).  See also supra Part I. 
93 Rockwell, 393 Mich. at 636-37. 
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unfair labor practice strike and the striking employees entitled to reinstatement.”94  In this 
situation, however, even though the strike would be considered an unfair labor practice strike, 
the strike would also be taken for the purpose of coercing a change in the conditions of 
employment—expressly prohibited under PERA.  This explains part V of the Court’s opinion, 
where the Court states: 
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the MERC which has 
not been considered on its merits.95  Its amended charge, filed after the December 
30, 1974 discharge of the teachers, asserts that ‘[a]ny interruptions in the 
performance of teaching duties by teachers in such district have been directly 
provoked and instigated by the unfair labor practices of respondent employer.’ 
If MERC should determine that the employing school district committed 




                                                          
These passages read together could indicate that under PERA, unfair labor practice 
strikes are illegal, and only differ from economic strikes to the extent that a striking employee 
seeks reinstatement.  But in every situation presented to the Court, even where the strike was 
“instigated by the unfair labor practices of the . . . employer,”97 the work stoppage was taken for 
the purpose of, at least partly, coercing a change in the working conditions of the striking 
employees.  This conduct is expressly prohibited under PERA.  Recall the illustration of the 
1965 amendments: 
94 Id. at 637. 
95 Eventually, the unfair labor practice charge was dismissed.  See In re: Crestwood School District Board of 
Education and Crestwood Education Association, 1975 MERC Lab. Op. 608.  “At the conclusion of those hearings, 
Judge Sperka found that there had been no unfair labor practices committed by the school board.”  Crestwood 
Education Ass’n v. Employment Relations Comm’n, 71 Mich. App. 347; 248 N.W.2d 266 (1976). 
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 Under this diagram, W represents every work stoppage, and X represents work stoppages 
for the purpose of coercing a change in the conditions of employment—which we already know 
is prohibited under PERA.  However, if U represents work stoppages for the purpose of 
responding to unfair labor practices by a public employer, then the diagram illustrates that 
although some unfair labor practice strikes will also be economic strikes and therefore prohibited 
by PERA, unfair labor practice strikes may be taken for the sole purpose of protesting an unfair 
labor practice and therefore not prohibited by PERA.  Furthermore, because the teachers in 
Rockwell admittedly struck for the purpose of coercing a change in the conditions of 
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employment,98 the Court’s discussion of illegal unfair labor practice strikes is limited to strikes 
that are also economic strikes.99 
 The limitation of illegal strikes to strikes that are also economic strikes is important to the 
public employee because of the limitation it imposes on the public employer’s ability to 
terminate “striking” employees. 
[In the private sector,] . . . an economic strike is protected concerted activity . . . 
[and] it is an unfair labor practice for a private employer to discharge an employee 
. . . before the employee has been replaced. 
. . .  
However, in contrast with [the private sector], the PERA prohibits strikes in 
public employment; public employment strikes, therefore, are not protected 
“lawful concerted [activity]” . . . within the meaning of § 9 of the PERA.100 
 
 Therefore, if an unfair labor practice strike is not prohibited by PERA, then it is protected 
“lawful concerted activity” and termination of a striking employee prior to replacement would 
constitute an unfair labor practice by the employer. 
 Rockwell is important because it distinguished between unfair labor practice strikes and 
economic strikes and furthers the NLRA’s “balance of power” goal in doing so.  The legality of 
an unfair labor practice strike would justify even more application of NLRA case law on the 
subject, but the “legality” of such a strike was at best an “uncertainty.” 
 The Michigan Court of Appeals had addressed the unfair labor practice strike issue six 
months earlier in Warren Education Ass’n v. Adams.101  In Warren Education, public school 
                                                          
98 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
99 This reasoning is consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lake Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. 
Lake Michigan Community College, 518 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1975), issued three months after the Supreme Court’s 
Rockwell decision.  In Lake Michigan, the Sixth Circuit stated that although “PERA could be interpreted as 
prohibiting only economic strikes, not work stoppages in protest of an unfair labor practice committed by the 
employer . . . Rockwell makes it clear that a strike by public employees is illegal even though the employer has 
committed an unfair labor practice.” Lake Michigan, 518 F.2d at 1098-99.  But this statement must be read in 
context.  In Lake Michigan, as in Rockwell, the teachers went on strike in order to effect a change in employment 
conditions, and subsequently claimed that the strike was precipitated by the employer’s unfair labor practice.  See 
Lake Michigan, 518 F.2d at 1092-93.  Thus, the strike by the faculty in Lake Michigan was illegal, even if the 
employer had committed unfair labor practices, because it was taken initially for an illegal purpose. 
100 Rockwell, 393 Mich. at 637-38. 
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teachers had gone on strike in the Warren Consolidated School District in response to the 
unilateral implementation of “interim operating regulations” by the School District following the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement and in order to pressure the School District to 
return working conditions to as they stood under the expired contract.102 
 The main issue before the court of appeals had been whether the teachers’ refusal to work 
constituted a “strike” within the statutory definition of strike in PERA.103  The court of appeals 
had implicitly acknowledged that not every work stoppage by public employees could be 
considered a strike, but held that this particular work stoppage constituted a strike because “the 
teachers were seeking a change from the situation as it existed under the interim operating 
regulations, [and therefore] they were seeking a ‘change in the conditions’ within the meaning of 
the . . . statute.”104  This view is consistent with the premise that an economic strike, even if it is 
also an unfair labor practice strike, is illegal under PERA; while a work stoppage solely in 
response to an employer’s unfair labor practice is protected concerted activity. 
 Over a decade later, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission [hereinafter 
MERC] undertook a similar analysis in In re Hart Public Schools105 and In re Kent County 
Education Ass’n.106  In both cases, teachers’ unions had authorized strikes during contract 
negotiations.  In Hart Public Schools, the union had sent the School Board a letter indicating that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
101 57 Mich. App. 496; 226 N.W.2d 536 (1975). 
102 See Warren Education Ass’n v. Adams, 57 Mich. App. 496, 498-99; 226 N.W.2d 536 (1975).  “[T]he sole 
purpose of the strike was to seek reinstatement of the provisions of the previous expired contract which had been 
deleted or modified by the ‘interim operating regulations.’”  Warren Education Ass’n, 57 Mich. App. at 498. 
103 See id. at 499. 
104 Id. at 500.  However, the converse of the court of appeals’ rationale is that if the teachers had withheld their 
services solely in response to the unilateral implementation of the “interim operating regulations” by the School 
District and had waited until after the School District had returned working conditions to as they stood under the 
expired contract, then the “strike” could not have been for the purpose of “coercing a change in the conditions . . . of 
employment” and would not have been a prohibited strike under PERA.  Unfortunately, the court of appeals didn’t 
address this issue specifically.  See id. 
105 Case No. CU87 I-54, C87 I-204, 1989 M.P.E.R. (L.R.P.) LEXIS 136. 
106 Docket No. CU92 I-51, 1994 M.P.E.R. (L.R.P.) LEXIS 45. 
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they were empowered with the authority to call a strike.  The letter stated that they were so 
empowered because: 
[t]he Association’s bargaining team ha[d] been faced with a series of unfair labor 
practices originating from [the employer’s] spokesman at the table.  This c[ould] 
be demonstrated by such actions as: 
(1)  Regressive bargaining, 
(2)  Imposing additional work hours without a bargaining position, 
(3)  Failing to bargain in a sincere and fair manner. 
 The Association does express its desire to continue and meet and bargain 
with [the employer’s] representatives in an attempt to reach a fair and equitable 
contract for both parties.  However, if the actions of the Board’s representatives 
continue, that the Association’s bargaining team will have no other alternative 
than to impose the job action.107 
 
 
                                                          
Once the employees went on strike, the employer claimed the strike was an unfair labor 
practice by the union and a violation of PERA.108  The union defended by claiming that the 
purpose of the strike was “’to publicize unfair labor practices of [the] school district,’ rather than 
to induce, influence, or coerce change in conditions or compensation.”109  However, the MERC 
rejected the union’s argument because the facts did not support the union’s contention that the 
purpose of the strike was merely to publicize unfair labor practices.110 
 In Kent County,111 under similar facts, the employer brought an unfair labor practice 
charge against the union for an allegedly illegal strike.112  According to the employer, the 
Michigan Supreme Court had rejected the argument that public employee strikes protesting 
unfair labor practices constituted an exception to the PERA prohibition on strikes in Rockwell.113  
In response, the MERC stated: 
the [Unions] went on an illegal economic strike to enforce demands for more 
benefits.  This strike was initiated without any concern for the PERA prohibition 
107 Hart Public Schools, 1989 M.P.E.R. (L.R.P.) at 20-21. 
108 Id. at 2. 
109 Id. at 3. 
110 See id. at 24-25. 
111 1994 M.P.E.R. (L.R.P.) LEXIS 45. 
112 See Kent County, 1994 M.P.E.R. (L.R.P.) LEXIS 45 at *1. 
113 See id. at 13-14. 
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against any such activity.  These Unions have adopted the strike as a regular 
policy for collective bargaining.  PERA’s admonition against public strikes, by 
declaring them illegal, has been ignored by the Unions.114 
 
 
                                                          
MERC’s unwillingness to address the legality of a pure unfair labor practice strike and its 
proclivity to consider such a strike an economic strike, and therefore prohibited, should not be 
taken as an endorsement of the view that, as under the 1947 Hutchinson Act, all concerted public 
employee work stoppages are illegal.  But by the beginning of the 1990’s, it was undeniable that 
the MERC, the Michigan Legislature and the Executive were increasingly frustrated with public 
school employees’ unions’ willingness to use the strike as an economic weapon, regardless of its 
illegality, in the collective bargaining process.115  As a sign of the power shift to come, the 
MERC reversed its longstanding approach to a public employer’s ongoing duty to bargain in 
good faith in the midst of a public employee strike in Melvindale-Northern Allen Park Public 
Schools116 [hereinafter M-NAP].  
 Prior to M-NAP, a public employer was under a duty to bargain in good faith even during 
an ongoing public employee economic strike.117  This approach was consistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s approach to private sector employee strikes under the NLRA.118  In the private 
sector, however, economic strikes are not prohibited.  Furthermore, the NLRB had previously 
held that an employer’s duty to bargain under the NLRA may be suspended where the employees 
114 Id. at 17-18. 
115 See e.g., Letter from John Engler, Governor, State of Michigan, to David Kovac (Nov. 3, 1992) (on file at 
Michigan Historical Records). 
Michigan’s Public Employment Relations Act states unequivocally in Section 2 that, “No person 
holding a position in the public school service shall strike.”  Yet, year after year, we see teachers 
unions out at the picket line and out of the classroom in direct violation of the law.  Unfortunately, 
my ability to enforce this law is limited. 
Id. at 1. 
116 1992 MERC Lab Op.  400, 410. 
117 See Saginaw Twp Bd of Educ. v. Saginaw Twp Educ. Ass’n, 1970 MERC Lab Op 127. 
118 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.   
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strike in violation of a no-strike clause.119  In M-NAP, accordingly, the MERC reversed twenty-
years of case law and found that a public employer acts in good faith when it “temporarily and 
‘reasonably’ suspends bargaining during the pendency of an illegal strike.”120  According to the 
MERC: 
[i]t is . . . the purpose of PERA, like the Hutchinson Act which preceded it, to 
prohibit public employee strikes.  Indeed . . . the preamble suggests that 
prohibition of strikes is a primary purpose of the Act.  We agree . . . that one of 
the purposes of the statute is to preserve a “balance” between public employers 
and public employees and their representatives.  However, unlike bargaining 
under the NLRA, the system of collective bargaining contemplated by PERA is 
founded on the premise that public employees will not strike.  In return for 
depriving employees of the right to strike, essential under the NLRA, the 
Legislature . . . provided employees with a fact finding procedure to help resolve 
disputes.  Moreover, because of the strike prohibition, the Commission and the 
Courts have construed Section 15 of PERA more expansively than its NLRA 
counterparts to require mandatory bargaining on a wider range of subjects.121 
 
 The MERC, however, refused to decide whether a public employer’s duty to bargain is 
also suspended during an unfair labor practice strike.122  But if the employer’s duty to bargain is 
suspended because of their employees’ participation in an illegal strike, the legality of an unfair 
labor practice strike would suggest that the duty to bargain would continue during such a strike, 
unless of course the employer could show the object of the strike was also to coerce a change in 
the terms and conditions of employment. 
                                                          
119 See United Electrical, Radio, & Machine Workers of America v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955).  See also 
supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
120 M-NAP, 1995 M.P.E.R. (L.R.P.)33, *7.  
121 Id. at *9.  The MERC published its decision explaining its rationale on January 18, 1995.  Although part of its 
rationale explained that the MERC and the courts construe “PERA more expansively . . . to require mandatory 
bargaining on a wider range of subjects . . . ” so as to justify its decision, 1994 PA 112 had already passed the 
legislature and it was clear that it would greatly restrict PERA and require bargaining on a narrower range of 
subjects for public school teachers.    
122 Id. at *13 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 462 (2nd Cir. 1954)).  C.f., supra notes 32-37 and 
accompanying text.  Part of the MERC’s reasoning relied upon the premise that under the NLRA, a strike in 
violation of a no-strike clause suspends the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith.  See supra note 119 and 
accompanying text.   In Mastro Plastics, however, an unfair labor practice strike was not considered a “strike” for 
purposes of a no-strike clause.  The same logic would apply here.  
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The failure of either the Judiciary or the MERC to rule on the legality of an unfair labor 
practice strike created uncertainty when either labor or management were planning for a strike.  
For if a strike were ever deemed an unfair labor practice strike, neither labor nor management 
could accurately predict the cost of the strike to their side.  To a certain extent, this uncertainty 
was itself a balancing factor in the power struggle between labor and management.  Undoubtedly 
though, the MERC’s decision in M-NAP strengthened the bargaining position of public 
employers and worsened the bargaining position of public employees by placing an emphasis on 
PERA’s prohibition on strikes.  This change in emphasis was simultaneously occurring in the 
Legislature. 
C.  1994 and into the Future 
1.  1994 Public Act 112 
 In 1994, the Michigan Legislature made significant changes to the Public Employees 
Relations Act123 and for the first time, PERA distinguished between different types of public 
employees.  The Legislature altered the definition of strike under PERA, imposed stricter 
enforcement measures to deter future strikes, fundamentally altered the balance of power 
between employee and employer, and drastically impaired a union’s ability to maintain 
consistency in the terms and conditions of employment between different bargaining units 
throughout the state.  All of these changes were addressed specifically to those public employees 
that had proven to be most troublesome—public school teachers. 
In regards to all public employees except public school employees, PERA retained the 
1965 definition of strike activity and the 1965 definition of conduct deemed to be strike 
                                                          
123 Act of May 2, 1994, 1994 Public Act 112 [hereinafter 1994 PERA Amendments]. 
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activity.124  However, “[f]or employees of a public school employer, strike also include[ed] an 
action . . . taken for the purpose of protesting or responding to an act alleged or determined to be 
an unfair labor practice committed by the public school employer.”125  This definition of strike 
was also used to define the conduct of public school employees that would be considered “strike 
activity.”126  The effect of this definition was to prohibit a type of work stoppage for public 
school employees previously not statutorily prohibited.  To illustrate again: 
                                                          
124 1994 PERA Amendments §§ 1 & 7.  A strike for non-public school public employees is defined and deemed as a 
work stoppage “for the purpose of influencing or coercing a change in employment conditions, compensation, or the 
rights, privileges, or obligations of employment.”  §§ 1 & 7. 
125 1994 PERA Amendments § 1 (emphasis added). 
126 1994 PERA Amendments § 7. 
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 In addition to the expansion of the definition of strike activity in relation to public school 
employees, the 1994 amendments strengthened the enforcement measures available to public 
school employers in case of a public school employee strike.127  These measures harkened back 
to the Hutchinson Act enforcement provisions repealed by PERA in 1965.128  The 1994 
Amendments imposed mandatory fines on public school employees if they were found to have 
participated in a prohibited strike,129 imposed mandatory fines on the bargaining representative 
of the striking public school employees of $5,000.00 per day regardless of the bargaining 
representative’s participation in or encouragement of the prohibited strike,130 and, if requested by 
a public school employer, required a court to issue an injunction enjoining a strike by public 
school employees “if the court [found] that a strike . . . had occurred, without regard to the 
existence of other remedies, demonstration of irreparable harm, or other facts.”131 
 In addition to stricter enforcement measures, the 1994 amendments tried to decrease 
strikes by severely impacting the bargaining leverage of public school employees in other ways.  
One such method was to remove from the bargaining table nine areas where bargaining had been 
particularly contentious.132  These nine areas, though directly related to terms and conditions of 
                                                          
127 See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
128 See §§ 4 & 8 1947 Act; 1965 amendments. 
129 See 1994 PERA Amendments § 4. 
130 See 1994 PERA Amendments § 4. 
131 1994 PERA Amendments § 10 (emphasis added). 
132  See MICH. COMP. LAWS 423.215(3) (West 2001). 
(3)  Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees shall 
not include any of the following subjects: 
 (a)  Who is or will be the policyholder of an employee group insurance benefit. . . . 
(b)  Establishment of the starting day for the school year and the amount of pupil contact time required to 
receive full state school aid . . .  
(c)  Composition of site-based decision-making bodies established . . .  
(d)  The decision of whether or not to provide or allow interdistrict or intradistrict open enrollment 
opportunity . . .  
(e)  The decision of whether or not to act as an authorizing body to grant a contract to organize and operate 
1 or more public school academies . . . or the granting of leave to a public school employee to participate in 
a public school academy. 
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employment, were no longer mandatory subjects of bargaining.  These subjects were now 
prohibited and bilateral negotiation on these topics was replaced with unilateral implementation 
by the public school employer.133  The amendments also eliminated the union’s power to veto or 
require ratification of a collective bargaining agreement reached between a public school 
employer and bargaining unit members.134  This destroyed the union’s ability to maintain 
consistency in demands between different public school districts and bargaining units throughout 
the state.  
 The expansion of the definition of strike; the stricter enforcement measures; the removal 
of the nine subjects of collective bargaining from the table; and the elimination of union veto 
power demonstrate a departure from not only thirty years of case-law, but also a departure from 
the central tenet of collective bargaining: maintaining the balance of power between labor and 
management.  The response of the judiciary to these changes could determine the future of 
collective bargaining for public employees. 
2.  Case Law in Response to 1994 PERA Amendments 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(f)  The decision of whether or not to contract with a third party for 1 or more noninstructional support 
services; or the procedures for obtaining the contract; or the identity of the third party; or the impact of the 
contract on individual employees or the bargaining unit. 
(g)  The use of volunteers in providing services at its schools. 
(h)  Decisions concerning use of experimental or pilot programs and staffing of [such] . . . programs and 
decisions concerning use of technology  . . . and staffing to provide the technology, or the impact of these 
decisions on individual employees or the bargaining unit. 
(i)  Any compensation or additional work assignment intended to reimburse an employee for or allow an 
employee to recover any monetary penalty imposed under this act. 
Id. 
133 “The matters described in subsection (3) are prohibited subjects of bargaining between a public school employer 
and a bargaining representative of its employees, and, for the purpose of this act, are within the sole authority of the 
public school employer to decide.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS 423.215(4) (West 2001). 
134 See MICH. COMP. LAWS 423.217(1) (West 2001). 
 
The effect of Section 17 is to decapitate school employee unions.  Both “bargaining 
representatives” and “education associations” are prohibited—for the first time in the history of 
public employee collective bargaining in Michigan, and exclusively as to school employees—
from effective involvement in their own collective bargaining. 
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 Almost immediately after the 1994 amendments were passed, the Supreme Court 
addressed a constitutional challenge in Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Employment Relations 
Comm’n.135  In Michigan State AFL-CIO, the Michigan Education Association and the Michigan 
State AFL-CIO brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1994 amendments.136 
 In circuit court, the plaintiffs in Michigan State AFL-CIO, on motion for summary 
disposition, had made multiple challenges to PERA’s new treatment of strike activity.137  The 
plaintiffs had challenged the provisions of the PERA amendments fining the collective 
bargaining representative for strikes by represented public school employees;138 requiring the 
courts to issue a mandatory injunction during an illegal strike, regardless of the equities of the 
situation;139 and prohibiting unfair labor practice strikes.140  The circuit court had granted the 
motion with respect to PERA’s imposition of fines against collective bargaining representatives 
and with respect to PERA’s treatment of mandatory injunctions.141  According to the circuit 
judge, the fines against the collective bargaining representative violated due process and the 
injunction provision violated the separation of powers doctrine.142  These rulings were not 
challenged on appeal and have not been addressed by the Supreme Court. 
With respect to PERA’s prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes, however, the circuit 
court had denied the plaintiffs’ motion and upheld the validity of the amendments.143 The court 
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136 See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Employment Relations Comm’n, 453 Mich. 362, 367; N.W.2d 165 (1996). 
137 I do not address the plaintiffs’ challenge to the definition of “strike” grounded in the potential ambiguity between 
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conducted by a single public employee. 
138 See Michigan State AFL-CIO, 453 Mich. at 367.  See also 1994 PERA Amendments § 2(a)(4). 
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142 See id.  See also City of Holland, 380 Mich. at 314; supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
143 See Michigan State AFL-CIO, 453 Mich. at 267. 
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of appeals had affirmed.144  Before the Michigan Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued that this 
prohibition violated their First Amendment free speech rights.145  To begin its analysis, the Court 
clarified that: 
[Under PERA,] a strike is defined in relation to the motivation for the work 
stoppage.  As applied to public school employees, the list of prohibited 
motivations includes protesting unfair labor practices.146 
 
 The Court then noted that PERA only prohibited the conduct of striking, using the 
motivation of the “striker” as the determinant of whether or not the public employee was actually 
on strike.147  Therefore, according to the Court, in contrast to a “prohibit[ion] [on] picketing on 
the basis of the motivation for the picketing, . . . [w]ithholding services alone does not 
communicate a sufficiently distinctive message”148 to bring such activity within the protection of 
the First Amendment.149  The Court upheld PERA’s prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes 
by public school teachers, but the Court reiterated its treatment of unfair labor strikes espoused in 
Rockwell.150  According to the Court: 
Rockwell held that the MERC may reinstate teachers who were engaged in an 
unfair labor practice strike if reinstatement best effectuated the policies of the 
PERA.  However, this Court decided Rockwell on the basis of a separate section 
of the PERA not amended by 1994 P.A. 112.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Rockwell is unaltered by Act 112.151 
 
 Rockwell had dealt with the MERC’s ability to reinstate terminated employees pursuant 
to section 16 of PERA.  But while the Supreme Court in Michigan State AFL-CIO claimed that 
                                                          
144 See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Michigan Employment Relations Comm’n, 212 Mich. App. 472; 538 N.W.2d 
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146 Id. at 383. 
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Rockwell was unaltered by the 1994 PERA Amendments, the illegality of a public school 
employee unfair labor practice strikes all but eliminates the applicability of NLRA case law on 
the subject. 
 Public employment law appears to be coming full circle.  From 1947-1965 public 
employees had very little voice in the terms and conditions of their employment.  In 1965 the 
Michigan Legislature provided public employees with such a voice, but the use of this voice by 
public school teachers caused the Legislature to try and take it away with the 1994 PERA 
Amendments.  Under the NLRA, collective bargaining works because Congress, the NLRB, and 
the courts consistently work to maintain a balance of power between labor and management.  In 
Michigan, however, while the MERC and the state courts have arguably tried to maintain this 
balance, as a matter of public policy, the Michigan Legislature has unnecessarily worked to 
disrupt it. 
III.  PUBLIC POLICY 
A.  Approaches to the Public Employee Labor Relations 
In the public sector, employment relations acts are torn between two potentially polar 
opposite objectives: (1) to prevent strikes by public employees and (2) to protect the rights of 
public employees to bargain collectively.  Several approaches have been suggested to address the 
conflict between these two legislative goals: the punitive approach, a recognition of a limited 
right to strike, the aid to bargaining approach, and the unfair labor practice proceeding.152  In 
addition, there are three ways the terms and conditions of employment can be set in a public 
employee setting.  The terms and conditions of employment may be unilaterally set by the 
employer, bilaterally set through collective bargaining, or set by a neutral third party through 
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arbitration. 153  Over the years, Michigan has incorporated some elements of each of these 
approaches to public sector labor relations as a means of supporting one or more methods of 
implementing the terms and conditions of employment. 
The punitive approach operates under the presumption that “imposition of penalties for 
striking will deter future strikes.”154  The Hutchinson Act’s penalties are an example of this 
model,155 as are the 1994 PERA Amendments.156  Strict application of the punitive approach is 
criticized because many feel that punishment of strikers, rather than deterring future strikes, 
raises strikers to “martyr status” and solidifies labor against the strike prohibition—causing 
disrespect for the law by encouraging public employees to flout the law in order to achieve their 
contract demands.157  For example, in response to proposed changes to PERA in the mid-1970’s, 
the Michigan Federation of Teachers issued a position statement which read in part: 
Whereas, the right of collective bargaining, including the right to strike is a basic 
right of all workers, and 
Whereas, any attack on the right of collective bargaining is an attack on all 
unions, . . . THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:  that the Michigan Federation of 
Teachers will join with other unions to initiate a mass campaign against this anti-
labor, anti-union legislation . . . .158 
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A stringently punitive approach may be functional as long as employees are unorganized and jobs 
are scarce.  But as the relative affluence and strength of employee organizations increase, the 
obvious inequity of the purely punitive approach may encourage public employee strikes rather 
than prevent them. 
 
Id. at 271.  The failure of the Taylor law in New York in the mid-1960’s demonstrates the inadequacy of a 
strict punitive approach..  See Kheel, supra note 153 at 936 (“the Taylor Law . . . made subversive a form 
of conduct society endorses for private workers . . . [i]t encouraged unions to threaten to strike to achieve 
the bargaining position participants in collective bargaining must possess . . . [i]t made the march to jail a 
martyr’s procession and a badge of honor for union leaders . . .  [i]t hardened positions . . . [and] it did not . 
. . work as mechanism for resolving conflicts in public employment”). 
158 Substitute for Resolutions # 4 and # 8 of the Michigan Federation of Teachers, 40th Annual Convention (May 3-
4, 1974) (on file with Michigan Historical Records). 
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The Michigan Legislature’s increasing reliance on the punitive approach strengthens the 
public employer’s ability to unilaterally implement the terms and conditions of employment.  As 
stated by Lawrence Reed of the conservative Mackinac Center for Public Policy “PA 112 
make[s] it easer for management to manage and for teachers to teach,“ regardless of the impact 
this has on a public school employee’s ability to affect the terms and conditions of  their 
employment.159 
The limited right to strike approach, however, attempts to maintain a balance in power 
between labor and management and to allow, as much as possible, the bilateral implementation 
of terms and conditions of employment.  The limited right to strike, however, accepts the 
proposition that “the simple right of representation, even when coupled with a duty to bargain, is 
not enough to achieve a balance of power.”160  Those against the limited right to strike argue that 
such a right would skew the bargaining leverage drastically in favor of labor because of the 
political nature of public employment not present in the private sector.161  To the extent the 
Supreme Court’s City of Holland decision prevented public employers and the legislature from 
enjoining public school strikes absent a showing of irreparable injury, City of Holland could be 
interpreted as providing public employees with the ability to strike.162 
 Under the aid to bargaining approach, different techniques such as mediation, fact-
finding, and arbitration are utilized in an attempt to settle disputes between labor and 
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management.  Michigan public employment law provides all three of these techniques in one 
form or another.  Fact-finding followed by mediation is available to both public employers and 
employees upon request163 and upon reaching impasse, additional mediation is available to 
public school employees as long as both parties agree.164  Mediation, however, though helpful in 
allowing the parties to see a different perspective and to better evaluate their own positions, is 
not binding on either party and provides no real method of impasse resolution.  Under the aid to 
bargaining approach, arbitration provides the only true means of impasse resolution.  Arbitration, 
however, is currently only available for labor disputes involving police and fire fighters.165 
 Finally, Michigan provides a fact-finding unfair labor practice proceeding (MERC 
proceeding) with exclusive jurisdiction to decide alleged unfair labor practices.166  While this 
deters unfair labor practices by the public employer, the machinery of the unfair labor practice 
proceeding is too unwieldly and time-consuming to be useful to a union during collective 
bargaining.167 
 In Michigan, then, our approach to public employment law has gone from punitive under 
the Hutchinson Act, to a mix between the punitive approach (illegality of strikes), a limited 
“ability” to strike approach (City of Holland), and a limited aid to bargaining approach 
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(mediation, fact-finding, unfair labor practice proceedings, and arbitration for police and fire 
fighters); and back to the punitive approach (1994 PERA Amendments). 
C. The Problem with Michigan’s Approach to Public Employee Strikes 
Michigan’s approach to collective bargaining and employee strikes in the public sector is 
problematic for at least three reasons: (1) it unduly undermines the stability and equality, and 
thus the effectiveness of the collective bargaining process for public school employees (and 
derivatively—all public employees); (2) it unnecessarily prohibits unfair labor practice strikes by 
public school employees, and (3) it draws a distinction between public school employees and 
non-public school public employees that could raise concerns in the future. 
 Michigan’s approach to public sector employment undermines the stability and equality 
and thus effectiveness of collective bargaining for public school employees because it 
unnecessarily breaks from the approach taken under the NLRA.168  This is true both with respect 
to collective bargaining itself and the maintenance of the balance of power. 
First, under the NLRA, collective bargaining was intended to both reduce labor disputes and 
increase wages.169  Collective bargaining itself worked because it brought the parties together,170 
unions became more responsible with recognition and experience,171 the employee collective was 
more influential than individual employees,172 and collective bargaining replaced unilateral 
implementation with bilateral discussions.173  Under the 1994 PERA Amendments, however, 
unilateral implementation of major public school employee concerns replaced bilateral 
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discussion,174 the strength of the employee collective was greatly diminished by the 
“decapitation” of the public school employees’ unions175 (which logically would also have an 
adverse effect on the “maturity” of the now diverse and segregated unions), and since M-NAP, 
the public school employer was no longer under an obligation to bargain in certain 
circumstances.176  Taken together, Michigan law has eroded the basis upon which the collective 
bargaining process relies in order to work.  This is especially worrisome because of Michigan’s 
failure to maintain a balance of power between labor and management in the area of work 
stoppages. 
 In order to maintain a balance of power under the NLRA, the judiciary has differentiated 
between unfair labor practice strikes and economic strikes.177  This distinction helped deter 
unfair labor practices by the employer by not rewarding such conduct and thus helped maintain 
the balance of power.178  For public school employees under PERA, however, the distinction is 
no longer present, and the prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes and economic strikes 
rewards the public school employer’s attempts to destroy the power of the union through unfair 
labor practices.179 
 Although these changes are of immediate concern to public school employees, this is so 
because, historically, public school employees were the public employees most likely to use 
economic weapons in order to coerce a change in the terms and conditions of employment.  If 
other groups of public employees, such as public transit employees, are considering the use of 
economic weapons in order to coerce a change in the terms and conditions of employment, this 
activity could be chilled by Michigan’s reaction to such public school employee activity. 
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Second, Michigan’s prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes is unnecessary.  The Michigan 
legislature and the MERC became disgusted with the public school employees’ unions’ use of 
the unfair labor practice strike as an attempt to legitimize an economic strike in the face of an 
outright prohibition of economic strikes and arguable allowance of unfair labor practice 
strikes.180  PERA, however, already contained a prohibition on the use economic strikes181 and 
the use of an unfair labor practice strike to legitimize an economic strike would still be a work 
stoppage taken, at least in part, to coerce a change in the conditions of employment.182  For the 
Michigan legislature, however, the uncertainty inherent in the determination of a strike object 
was too detrimental to the public school employer’s interest in prohibiting economic strikes to 
allow public school employees to ever stop working in order to protest the unfair labor practices 
of their employer.  This uncertainty, however, was one of the last vestiges of power balancing 
that promoted successful collective bargaining and deterred public school employer unfair labor 
practices.183 
Lastly, Michigan’s approach to public employment law raises concerns for the future because 
of its distinction between public school employees and non-public school public employees.  For 
example, the 1994 PERA Amendments come down hard on public school employees.  But for 
non-public school employees, the dangers of public school employment strikes are still present 
for other public employees.  A ten-day public garbage disposal employee unfair labor practice 
strike would arguably be much more detrimental to the health of a community than a ten-day 
strike, yet such a work stoppage is not prohibited under PERA. 
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In City of Detroit, the Michigan Supreme Court justified the prohibition of public employee 
strikes because of the importance of rendering essential government services,184 the absence of a 
right to strike under the common law,185 and the sovereignty principle.186  As a matter of policy, 
the prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes doesn’t meet the “importance of rendering 
essential government services” rationale for two reasons.  First, other public-sector employees 
who perform public services just as important to the health and safety of the community as 
public-school employees, yet there is no outright prohibition of unfair labor practice strikes in 
their case.  Second, in the field of education, there has been a significant push by the proponents 
of the 1994 PERA Amendments for an increase in private-school facilities—arguing that the 
“undue” power exerted by the teacher unions in Michigan is due to the lack of competition from 
the private sector.187  Yet this argument is inconsistent with the “essential government services” 
argument.  In the private sector, PERA would not prohibit private-school employees from 
organizing a union, forcing collective bargaining, and using the economic strike to force 
concessions from the private school employer.  If a teacher strike, regardless of its object, is so 
dangerous to the welfare of our children, why encourage potential strikes through privatization?  
Michigan policy-makers have used the public’s emotional response to teacher strikes to slowly 
implement their own policies regardless of their announced intentions. 
Undoubtedly, the Michigan Legislature’s imposition of the 1994 PERA Amendments was 
mainly because of the third justification posited by the City of Detroit Court—the Sovereignty 
principle.  Public school employees dared to challenge a law they felt unjustified188 and they 
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were severely punished—not only on a case by case factual basis189 but also by a near removal of 
their collective bargaining rights.   
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, Michigan law treats public-school employees differently because of this 
group’s historical proclivity to using economic weapons during collective bargaining.  Over 
time, Michigan has shifted from an apparent “limited right to strike approach”190 to an adoption 
of the “punitive approach” and unilateral implementation.  However, by paying lip-service to 
public-employees’ collective bargaining rights and severely punishing those groups of 
employees that test the limits of the law, Michigan policy has negative implications on the 
collective bargaining process and public employee relations in general. 
In response to the hypothetical posited in the introduction, under the current version of 
PERA, it seems unlikely, but Michigan law punishes more harshly those public school 
employees that stop work to prevent an illegal act of the employer (unfair labor practice strike) 
than those employees that take off work in order to watch a baseball game.  This is not how we 
should treat our public teachers.   
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